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WHAT CAN THE PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY NETWORK OFFER
TO OUR VETERANS?
David A. Boyer *
INTRODUCTION
The desire to compensate veterans predates the establishment of the United States (“U.S.”).
In 1636, individuals with disabilities received pensions for defending the Plymouth colony
against Native Americans. 1 Throughout history, this practice continued, as documented by the
U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”). 2 By 1930, President Herbert Hoover signed the
Executive Order 5398, which created the Veterans Administration. 3 Prior to President Hoover’s
signing of that executive order, the available veteran services were divided by three separate
governmental agencies: the Veterans’ Bureau, the Pensions Bureau, and the Soldiers’ Home. 4
Consequently, that executive order combined all three agencies into one that concentrated and
streamlined the available services for veterans. 5 By 1988, that agency elevated to a cabinet-level
position and renamed the VA. 6 The VA is comprised of three administrations: Veterans Health
Administration (“VHA”), Veterans Benefits Administration (“VBA”), and National Cemetery
Administration (“NCA”). 7 This article analyzes the VHA because it is the largest administration
of the three.
Additionally, this article addresses the inadequacies of the VHA due to excessively long wait
times and the neglect and abuse towards veterans. Examples will be used to show how the
oversight mechanisms have failed. Lastly, this article addresses alternative solutions to ensure
that veterans receive quality care through the extension of authority, which addresses the funding
of the existing Protection and Advocacy system that has been effective under similar
circumstances.
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I.

VETERANS’ HEALTH ADMINISTRATION

The VHA is the largest administration under the VA. As one of the largest health care
providers in the U.S, it serves over nine million veterans each year. 8 Accordingly, the VHA is
divided by eighteen Veterans Integrated Service Networks (“VISN”), which are geographic
administrative zones that serve as “regional systems of care working together to better meet local
health needs and provides greater access to care.” 9 The breadth of the VHA cannot be
undervalued. In its own words:
The VA operates more than 1,300 sites of care including nearly 900
ambulatory care and community-based outpatient clinics, 136 nursing homes, 43
residential rehabilitation treatment programs, nearly 90 comprehensive home-care
programs, and more than 200 Veterans Centers where approximately 2 million
veterans have been served since the first center opened in 1979. In 2005 alone,
Veterans Centers handled more than 1 million visits by nearly 133,000 veterans
and members of their families. 10
II.

INADEQUACIES OF THE VHA

Although the VHA’s long-standing issues extend into various contexts, this article
addresses the issues of excessively long wait times and the abuse and neglect of veterans.
A.

Long Wait Times

The wait time for veterans to receive health care has been “grossly mismanaged” at various
VA Health Care Systems (“VAHCS”). 11 In 2014, the most egregious complaints against the
VAHCS centered around the massive delays to provide healthcare to veterans. 12 Such delays
were reported throughout all the geographic administrative zones of the VHA. At the Phoenix
VA Health Care System (“PVAHCS”), up to forty veterans died due to delays in receiving
healthcare. 13 Moreover, on May 28, 2014, a report from the VA Office of Inspector General
(“VA OIG”) summarized an investigation regarding the delays. 14 The investigation showed that
at least 1,400 veterans were placed on an electronic waitlist at PVAHCS. 15 Before being placed
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on the electronic waitlist, 1,700 veterans were forced to wait to receive initial appointments. 16
Consequently, such delays caused a dual effect of underestimating wait times and depriving
veterans of receiving necessary medical appointments.
Moreover, VA OIG reported that the PVAHCS grossly underreported its average initial wait
times for veterans. 17 The daily average wait time was not twenty-four hours as initially reported;
instead, it was 115 days long. 18 By 2002, over 300,000 veterans were either placed on waitlists
or forced to wait over six months to make an appointment at the VHA. 19
Based on the VA OIG report, the then-VA Secretary Eric Shinsheki recommended that VHA
doctors see new patients within fourteen days. 20 However, as an attempt to lower the apparent
long wait times, employees strategically avoided the new waitlist requirement by engaging in
“gaming strategies.” 21 On the outset, VHA employees maintained two separate patient lists: one
to show VHA officials and one kept internally at respective VHA locations. 22 The first
demonstrated that veterans were provided with timely appointments. 23 However, the second
confirmed that veterans waited for more than a year to receive treatment. 24
The increase in long wait times reflected the increase in veterans brought to the VHA after
returning from recent conflicts. In 2001, the VHA reported that 482,448 veterans had a fifty
percent or higher rate of being disabled. 25 From 2007 to 2013, the average caseload of the VHA
increased dramatically due to the rapid influx of veterans returning from Iraq and Afghanistan. 26
By 2017, the number of veteran disabilities soared to over two million. 27 The overwhelming
increase of caseloads in the VHA has burdened the system’s efficiency. 28 The system just cannot
keep up with the demand, and further resources are nowhere in sight. 29
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B.

Abuse and Neglect of Veterans

Veterans, in or out of any VHA facility, represent a population that is vulnerable to abuse and
neglect. Veterans should receive protections equal to civilians. Veterans are more susceptible to
abuse and neglect as compared to civilians because veterans experience higher occurrences of
poor physical and psychological health, functional and cognitive impairment, and isolation from
the general population. 30 At a VHA nursing facility in Los Angeles, California, a study of 575
veterans found that within three years of a patient’s stay, approximately 5.4% of its patients
experienced abuse or neglect. 31 Unfortunately, much of this abuse and neglect goes unreported. 32
Therefore, the data on abuse and neglect against veterans remains limited. 33
Although the data regarding abuse and neglect is limited, the general public and media
continue to criticize the quality of care provided at VHA facilities. In 2017, USA Today and the
Boston Globe exposed that VHA facilities compiled statistics on patient quality, but kept them
hidden from the public. 34 Accordingly, an investigation into the VHA facilities revealed that
VHA facilities “scored worse on average than [civilian facilities] on nine of eleven key
indicators.” 35 Moreover, nearly half of the VHA facilities received one-star ratings. 36 Even
today, veterans remain a vulnerable target for abuse and neglect. It is important to ensure that
VHA facilities provide quality care and safe places for veterans.
C.

The Current Oversight Scheme

Four government authorities conduct oversight of the VHA: Congress, the VA OIG, the
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”), and the newly-created VA Office of
Accountability and Whistleblower Protection (“OAWP”). The VHA believes that this level of
oversight is adequate, not excessive. 37 For instance, concerning a call for increased oversight of
the modernization of electronic health records, a VHA spokesperson stated, “there are already
multiple avenues for robust Congressional oversight, including regular briefings and
Congressional hearings . . . engagement with GAO, regular statutory reporting requirements, and
responses to Congressional inquiries.” 38 Despite this seemingly adequate oversight, scandals

30

LK Makaroun et al., Veterans Experiencing Elder Abuse: Improving Care of a High-Risk Population
About Which Little Is Known, J. AM GERIATRICS SOC. (2017).
31
Ailee Moon et al., Elder Abuse and Neglect Among Veterans in Greater Los Angeles, 46 J. OF
GERONTOLOGICAL SOC. WORK 187 (2008).
32
Id.
33
Lidia Vognar et al., The Impact of Elder Abuse on a Growing Senior Veteran Population. FED. PRAC.
33(8), 22–26 (2016).
34
Secret VA nursing home ratings hide poor quality care from the public, USA TODAY (June 17, 2018,
8:08 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/06/17/secret-va-nursing-home-ratings-hide-poorquality-care/674829002/.
35
Id.
36
Id.
37
Kate Monica, VA Opposes 11-Member EHR Modernization Oversight Committee, EHR INTELLIGENCE
(May 28, 2019) https://ehrintelligence.com/news/va-opposes-11-member-ehr-modernization-oversight-committee.
38
Id.

91

continue to plague the VHA. 39 Before turning to an alternative oversight scheme, I will describe
the one currently in place.
Congress’s strong oversight authority over the VHA has been described as “indeed coextensive with the power to legislate.” 40 Douglas Kriner concludes in his evaluation of
Congressional oversight that “[w]hile oversight is a potentially important tool of legislative
influence; it is not one that Congress employs uniformly.” 41 Kriner argues that Congressional
oversight is driven by partisanship and tempered by political ambition. 42 Those ambitions limit
the ability of Congress to regulate the VHA meaningfully.
The VA OIG also exerts oversight authority over the VHA. VA OIG is among seventy-three
separate inspector general offices in the federal government that operate under the mission of
“investigating agency mismanagement, waste, fraud, and abuse, and providing recommendations
to improve federal programs and the work of federal agencies.” 43 Unfortunately, funding
challenges make the VA OIG a less effective oversight entity. Budget woes plague inspector
generals and are one of the most substantial constraints on the ability to exert oversight. 44
Funding is dependent on the federal budget and the politics surrounding this process. 45 The
Trump administration’s most recent budget forecasts a dramatic decrease in funding for several
OIGs. 46 VA OIG responded that the proposed budget “presents a shortfall that will undermine
progress achieved to ‘right size’ the OIG oversight capacity to the growth and demands of VA’s
new initiatives, increased funding environment, and ongoing work on behalf of veterans.” 47 The
proposed budget by the Trump administration would require the VA OIG to cut its staff by 30
employees. 48
The third government agency that exerts oversight authority over the VHA is the GAO.
According to the GAO, the agency “is an independent, nonpartisan agency that works for
Congress. Often called the ‘congressional watchdog.’ GAO examines how taxpayer dollars are
spent and provides Congress and federal agencies with objective, reliable information to help the
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government save money and work more efficiently.” 49 In 2015, the GAO placed the VHA on
high-risk status 50 for the following reasons: ambiguous policies and inconsistent processes,
inadequate oversight and accountability, information technology challenges, inadequate training
for VA staff, and unclear resource needs and allocation priorities. 51 The VHA acknowledges
that: “At any given time, there are [eighty] to 100 open recommendations about VA health care.
Overall, VA has succeeded in closing approximately 377 recommendations since 2009, and is
committed to closing as quickly as possible all [twenty-two] recommendations that GAO has
identified as high priority.” 52 Moreover, the GAO continues to press for more oversight and
accountability over the VHA. 53 However, the GAO is limited in its power because it merely
communicates its findings to Congress – it has no power to enforce its recommendations. 54
The last of these oversight authorities is the OAWP. Created by Executive Order in 2017, the
OAWP is a mechanism for VHA employees to report a potential violation of any law, rule or
regulation, gross mismanagement or gross waste of funds, abuse of authority, or substantial and
specific danger to public health or safety. The office was intended to provide oversight of
employee complaints, as well as complaints about inadequate patient care. Unfortunately, the
success of the OAWP is in question. Critics of the program raise concerns about the 2,558
employees that were terminated in the first year. 55 Efforts to repeal the bill have bipartisan
support in Congress, with one group stating that the VHA has failed to “demonstrate in any way
that implementation has been consistent, fair, and appropriate.” 56 While the VHA emphasizes the
importance of the OAWP, the OAWP has not accomplished its intended goals.
Each of the existing mechanisms of oversight of the VHA is severely limited. The common
factor among them is that they derive from the federal government. Absent from this scheme is
an independent oversight authority empowered with enforcement mechanisms.
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III.

THE PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY NETWORK PRESENTS ONE SOLUTION

If the current system of oversight is not effective, what might be a possible solution? The
Protection and Advocacy network presents a possible solution to the VHA’s oversight problem. I
propose that an existing system of oversight could be the way to ensure that the VHA provides
safe and effective treatment for our Veterans.
Although public outrage over conditions in VA facilities is relatively recent, shocking
conditions in other types of facilities is nothing new. In the 1960’s, attention focused on the
horrible abuses in large institutions for individuals with mental illness and developmental
disabilities. One example is Willowbrook State School, a New York run institution for
individuals with intellectual and developmental disabilities. 57 Willowbrook was home to
widespread abuse and neglect, including forcing residents to participate in a study on hepatitis. 58
By the middle of the 1960s, the census at the facility was approximately double its actual
capacity. 59 Residents were crammed into squalid conditions with a nearly 50:1 resident to
attendant ratio. 60 In 1965, New York Senator Robert Kennedy demanded reform as he described
Willowbrook as a “snake pit.” 61
That reform did not occur, and a young Geraldo Rivera, working as an investigative reporter,
reported on the conditions in 1972. 62 Increased oversight is often the result of moral or legal
wrongs that lead to public outrage. 63 Rivera’s coverage of the atrocities at Willowbrook sparked
public outrage and led to Congressional investigations that confirmed the worst suspicions. 64
Individuals with disabilities were being warehoused in large state institutions and subjected to
deprivations of basic human rights through abuse and neglect. 65 The 1975 amendments to the
Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act created a Protection and Advocacy
System (“P&A”) with authority to “pursue legal, administrative, and other appropriate remedies
or approaches to ensure the protection of, and advocacy for, the rights of individuals . . . with
developmental disabilities.” 66 Under the legislation, the governor of each state and territory had
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to appoint an organization to serve as the P&A. 67 Notably, however, the P&A could be a private,
not-for-profit, or state agency, but would remain independent of the state and any treatment
providers. 68 Today, most P&As are private, not-for-profit agencies.
The P&A system has grown since 1975 to encompass an ever-increasing array of disability
sub-groups and issues. The success of the system is evidenced by the continued congressional
expansion of the number of P&A programs to monitor conditions and investigate abuse and
neglect. The current programs that fall under the P&A rubric are as follows: Protection and
Advocacy for Individuals with Developmental Disabilities (PADD); 69 Protection and Advocacy
for Individuals with Mental Illness (PAIMI); 70 Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with
Traumatic Brain Injuries (PATBI); 71 Protection and Advocacy for Individual Rights (PAIR); 72
Protection and Advocacy for Beneficiaries with Representative Payees (PABRP); 73 Protection
and Advocacy for Beneficiaries of Social Security (PABSS); 74 Protection and Advocacy Vote
Act (PAVA); 75 Protection and Advocacy for Assistive Technologies (PAAT); 76 and Client
Advocacy Program (CAP). 77
In addition to advocacy and legal representation, P&As exercise special oversight tools
granted by several statutes. 78 Specifically, a P&A has wide-ranging authority to access locations
within its state where individuals with disabilities are receiving care or treatment. 79 This access
authority includes records and extends to (1) investigations triggered by a report or a
determination of probable cause, and (2) monitoring visits to ensure compliance with respect to
the rights and safety of individuals with disabilities. 80
P&A authority extends to various groups of individuals with disabilities, to various settings,
and various issues. However, various statutes drive P&A work by funding specific groups or
issues. For instance, the PADD program only funds work with individuals with developmental
disabilities, and the PAAT funds work with individuals that have assistive technology. P&As
have limited resources and are required to develop their priorities and objectives based on their
funding.
While P&As can (and do) work with Veterans, they are not granted specific funding for
VHA work. Currently, several federal legislators are pressing for a bill that would mandate P&A
67
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oversight in the VA system. 81 A specific funding source from Congress would send a signal that
P&As have an important role in monitoring the VHA, and P&As would be able to allocate
additional resources for increased monitoring and oversight of VHA facilities and programs.
IV.

PROTECTION AND ADVOCACY FOR VETERANS ACT

It is evident that increased oversight of the VHA is necessary. The current oversight scheme
is effective but limited. The VHA continues to experience scandal within its organization that
depletes its ability to complete its mission: “[t]o care for him who shall have borne the battle, and
for his widow, and his orphan[.]” 82 Unfortunately, our Veterans are receiving sub-optimal care
and are too often the victims of abuse and neglect.
Given this need for oversight and accountability, Congress has suggested the P&A network
as a monitoring arm for the VHA. A bill introduced in recent sessions of Congress – the
Protection and Advocacy for Veterans Act – proposed provision for the necessary protections for
our Veteran population. 83
The bill includes a five-year pilot program that would place the P&A network as a primary
means of oversight for the VHA. 84 It provides funding for four P&As (selected by the VA
Secretary) to carry out a demonstration project to investigate and monitor the care of Veterans at
VHA facilities. 85 The project focuses on two very important recent concerns of Veterans:
substance abuse and mental health.
Most importantly, the bill provides the same access authorities as the P&A possesses under
the PAIMI Act. 86 That is, the P&A would have reasonable unaccompanied access to VHA
facilities for the purposes of monitoring compliance with rights and safety, as well as
investigating possible instances of abuse and neglect. This authority would provide the most
powerful tools in a P&A’s repertoire, to efficiently and effectively provide oversight of the VHA
programs and services.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. has always been a country that believes that its Veterans should be provided quality
healthcare and benefits after their service is complete. Recently, the VHA has experienced
several scandals involving long wait-lists, inadequate treatment, and abuse and neglect. While
some oversight exists, it is limited by funding, authority, and political agendas. The Protection
and Advocacy for Veterans Act proposes harnessing the long-standing success and power of the
P&A network to provide the necessary oversight for our Veterans.
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